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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HIDDEN MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
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15188
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Appeal from Judgment of Fourth D1str1ct Court of Utah County,
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge
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NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action brought by way of a supplemental complaint to enforce the terms of a Decree of
Specific Performance.

In short, the original action was

filed by Hidden Meadows Development Company (Successor of
East Heber Development Company, hereinafter referred to
as Hidden Headows), respondent herein, against the first
defendants, to determine the validity of an option
granted by Dee Mills and Evelyn I. Mills in favor of the
respondent.
Subsequent thereto, trial was held in the
Fourth District Court, in and for Wasatch County, wherein
the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, District Judge, rendered
judgment in favor of the first defendants and against the
plaintiff (respondent herein) no cause of action.

The

court held that the option had been terminated, and that
the Hidden Meadows, could not exercise the option.
Subsequently, Hidden Meadows appealed the lower
court's decision to the Utah State Supreme Court.
Hidden Meadows moved the trial court for

~n

order grant-

ing supersedeas and the trial court ordered the same, but
on the condition

~hat

Hidden Meadows file, and have

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

approved by the court, a bond in the sum of $50,000 in
accordance with Rule 73(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

No supersedeas bond was ever filed or

approv~

Prior to the original trial, Dee Mills and
Evelyn I. Mills, had transferred and sold the real property in question to Milton A. Christensen, also known as
Milton C. Christensen, Paradise Valley Estates, Inc., and
Lake Mills Company, a limited partnership.

Following the

trial, the latter sold the property in question to second
defendants.

Thereafter, the Utah State Supreme Court

reversed the lower court's decision and directed the lower
court to enter a decree entitling Hidden Meadows to speci·
fie performance from Mills on the option to purchase the
real property.

(Hidden Meadows Development Company v.

~1ill

29 Utah 2d 469, 511 P.2d 737 (1973))
Hidden Meadows then filed its supplemental
complaint in the same action against the first defendants
for specific performance consistent with the decision
of the Utah State Supreme Court, and also named as second
defendants those partiss who had purchased the property in question, or succeeded to the same, after the
judgment in the trial court on the original action and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
- 2- by the Utah State Library.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

prior to reversal by the Utah State Supreme Court.

Hidden

Meadows allege that any interest the first or second
defendants, appellants herein, assert in the property is
inferior and subordinate to the interest of itself, and
that a decree of specific performance should be granted,
allowing the respondent herein to purchase the property
under the option agreement.
First defendants, Milton C. Christensen, also
known as

~ilton

Inc., and Lake

A. Christensen, Paradise Valley Estates,
~ills

Company, a limited partnership,

and second defendants, Carole Lee Christensen·, formerly
Carole Lee Davis, and Environmental Sciences, a limited
partnership, allege that they were and are good faith
purchasers of this property, and that Dee Mills and
Evelyn I. Mills were not prohibited from selling or
transferring the real property to them and conveying to
them clear, complete and unencumbered title.

It is

further alleged that Dee Mills and Evelyn I. Mills were
the legal title holders when they sold the property to
the first defendants and the original judgment rendered
by the District Court was self executing and cleared
title in their names allowing the free alienation of
the real property.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
- 3- OCR, may contain errors.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court, the Honorable Ernest F.
Baldwin sitting without a jury, entered judgment for the
plaintiff, Hidden Meadows, on its supplemental complaint
and held that all purchasers were not bona fide innocent
purchasers and were bound by the decision of the Utah
State Supreme Court reversing the judgment of the Fourth
District Court entered August 10, 1972 and the subsequent
Decree of Specific Performance entered by the Fourth
District Court on August 27, 1973.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Reversal of the decree entered in the trial
court after trial on this matter or, in the alternative,
for remand to the lower court for application of proper
measure of damages.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about July 28, 1964, the appellants, Dee
Mills and Evelyn I.

~ills,

gave to Hidden Meadow's pre-

decessor in interest an option to purchase a tract of
real property located in Wasatch County, Utah for a sum
as specified in said Option, which Option was duly

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

recorded in the office of the Recorder of Wasatch
County, Utah, on the 28th day of December, 1964, as
Entry

~o.

86844. (F.l, R.224; R.9).

Thereafter, on

September 28, 1971, respondent notified said appellants
Mills of its desire to exercise said option, but Mills
refused to acknowledge the option and asserted that it
had been terminated on September 4, 1971. (F.Z, R.224)
On October 15, 1971, appellants, Dee Mills
and Evelyn I.

~ills

conveyed the real property, the

subject of the option, to appellants, Milton C. Christensen,
also known as Milton A. Christensen, Lake Mills Company,
a limited partnership, and Paradise Valley Estates,
Inc. (F. 3, R.224; Ex 6-P, 7-P)
On or about December 10, 1971, Hidden Meadows
commenced an action in the District Court of Wasatch
County, State of Utah, seeking a decree of specific
performance with respect to the option against the appellants, Dee Mills and Evelyn I. Mills, Milton C. Christensen, also known as Milton A. Christensen, Lake

~1ills

Company, a limited partnership, and Paradise Valley
Estates, Inc., and on December 10, 1971, Hidden Meadows

-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding
for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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duly caused to be recorded in the office of the County
-Recorder of Wasatch County, Utah, a Notice of Lis Pendens
recorded as Entry No. 96131 in Book 78, at pages 84-85
of said records (F. 4, R. 225).

Subsequent to December

10, 1971, appellants, Carole Lee Davis, Environmental

Resources, Inc., and International Environmental Sciences,
a limited partnership, acquired an interest in said real
property from appellants Dee Mills and Evelyn I. Mills,
Milton C. Christensen, also known as Milton A. Christensen,
Paradise Valley Estates, Inc., and Lake Mills Company,
a limited partnership. (F. 5, R. 225)

On August 10, 1972, •

the Fourth District Court in and for Wasatch County,
Judge D. Frank Wilkins, presiding, entered judgment for
the appellants, Dee Mills and Evelyn I. Mills, Milton
C. Christensen, also known as Milton A. Christensen,
Paradise Valley Estates, Inc., and Lake

~ills

Company, a

limited partnership, holding that the option given to
Hidden Meadows was null and void.

(F. 6, R. 225)

Subsequent thereto Hidden Meadows timely
the judgment to the Utah State Supreme Court, Case
13076 (F. 7, R.

226-227).

In addition, Hidden

appeal~
~o.

~1eadows

(appellant in the former case) moved the trial court for

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

an order granting supersedeas and the trial court ordered
the same, but on the condition plaintiff file, and have
approved by the court, a bond in the sum of $50,000 in
accordance with Rule 73(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
(F.

8, R.

No supersedeas bond was ever filed or approved
226; R.

39, 44, 45, 137).

On January 2, 1973 Mills entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with Carole Lee Davis, a single
woman, thereby agreeing to convey any and all interest
in the subject property to her, subject to the conditions
set forth therein.

(Ex 19D)

January 3, 1973, Lake

~ills,

Subsequent thereto, on
a limited partnership and

Paradise Valley Estates, Inc., conveyed any and all interest in the subject real property to International
Environmental Sciences, a limited partnership, of which
Carole Lee Davis was a partner.

(Ex 8-P, 9-P)

On July 5, 1973, the Utah State Supreme Court
reversed the lower court's decision, and held the option
given by appellants (respondents in former suit), Dee
Hills and Evelyn I. Mills, to Hidden

~eadows

Development

Company, was valid, and thereafter, remanded the case to
the lower court for an aopropriate order in consonance

- 7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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with the opinion. (Hidden Meadows Development Company
vs. Mills, supra.; F.9, R. 226)

Said court further

decreed that Milton C. Christensen, also known as
Milton A. Christensen, Paradise Valley Estates, Inc.,
and Lake Mills Company, a limited partnership, and all
claiming under them or any one of them as against the
plaintiff and its

assig~s

had no right, title or inter-

est in said property or any part thereof.

(F. 10, R.

226; R. SO)
Thereafter, the appellants herein, Dee

~1ills

an:/

Evelyn I. Mills, failed and refused to comply with the
Decree of Specific Performance entered August 27, 1973,
on the grounds that said property, during the pendency
of said appeal and in the absence of a supersedeas bond,
was transferred to one or more of the following:
Carole Lee Christensen, formerly Carole Lee Davis,
Environmental Resources, Inc., International

Environme~i

Sciences, a limited partnership, John Dennis

Higginson~

Sherrel Higginson, also known as Rayma Sherrel W.

Higg~·

son, Evelyn I. Mills Trust, First Security Bank of Utah.
or Dale A. Allsop and Donna B. Allsop, his wife as bona
fide purchasers (F. 11, R. 227).

Subsequent thereto, a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-8Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

Motion to Vacate Decree of Specific Performance was
filed on behalf of appellants herein, (respondents in
the former case) but that motion was never heard by the
court.

(R.

52)

ARGUMENT
The primary issue before this court is the
duration of Lis Pendens and its effect on appeal when
no supersedeas is filed.

Emanating from this primary

issue are numerous secondary questions which must
necessarily be addressed in this brief and viewed by
this court.
POINT I.
THE EFFECT AND DURATION OF LIS PENDENS
TERMINATES ON FINAL JUDGMENT FROM THE
LOWER COURT UNLESS SUPERSEDEAS BOND IS POSTED
The facts of the instant case clearly illustrate
that the

rea~

property which is the subject of this

action was conveyed by the owner thereof to those
individuals and entities captioned as the "second
defendants" following a final judgment in the lower
court establishing the right of the owners, Dee Mills
and Evelyn I. Mills and others so captioned as "first
defendants" to alienate the real property and declaring
the option to respondent herein, null and void.
It is the position of appellants that the effect

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and duration of Lis Pendens terminates when judgment is
entered in the lower court and could not be extended by
Hidden Meadows Development Company without the filing of
the necessary supersedeas bond to preserve the status
quo following judgment.

It is obvious that the taking of

an appeal does not alone operate as a supersedeas and a
stay must be ordered and allowed in order to preserve the
subject matter or res of the suit.
The statutory provision setting forth the
requirements for Lis Pendens is contained in U.C.A.
Section 78-40-2 (1953) as follows:
Lis Pendens. In any action affecting the
title to, or the right of possession of,
real property the plaintiff at the time of
filing the complaint or thereafter, and the
defendant at tne time of filing his answer
when affirmative relief is claimed in such
answer, or at any time afterward, may file
for record with the recorder of the county
in which the property or some part thereof
is situated a notice of the pendency of the
action, containing the names of the parties
the object of the action or defense, and a
description of the property in that county
affected thereby. From the time of filing
such notice for record only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property
affected thereby be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action,
ana-only of its pendency against parties
designated by their real names. (Emphasis
added.)

-10-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Although the parameters surrounding the
filing and contents of the documents itself are covered
in the statute, nothing is set forth regarding the
total effect and duration of a Lis Pendens.
Generally, the doctrine of Lis Pendens continues
operative during the pendency of the action or suit until
it becomes final.

Whether a Lis Pendens remains in effect

and applies during the time for appeal depends on whether
the appeal is regarded as a continuation of the suit.

See

54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens, Section 36.
Whether or not the judgment of the lower court
is final for the purpose of terminating Lis Pendens has
not yet been decided by the Utah State Supreme Court.
It is abundantly clear that the law in the State
of Utah requires that an appeal may be taken only from
final orders and judgments in accordance with the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Utah Rules of Civil Proce-

dure, Rule 72(a) provides:
An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court
from all final orders and judgments in accordance with these rules; provided, that when
other claims remain to be determined in the

-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

proceedings, a party may preserve his right
to appeal on the decided issue until a final
determination of the other claims by filing
with the trial court and serving on the adverse parties within the time permited in
Rule 73(a) a notice of his intention to do so.
The phrase "final judgment" was defined in the
case of North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. The
Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co., 14 Utah 155, 46 P. 824 (1896),
an action brought seeking an injunction restraining defendants from polluting a surplus canal and neighboring land.
In holding that a party may not appeal an order pendente
lite, which is not a final order or judgment, leaving
issues remaining undecided, the court stated:
The word "final" or "final judgment" has a plain
meaning. A judgment, to be final, must dispose of the case as to all the parties, and
finally dispose of the subject matter of the
litigation on the merits of the case. Champ
vs. Kendrick, (Ind. Sup.) 30 N.E. 635. JjQii"Vier
defines a final judgment as used in opposition to interlocutory as "A final judgment is
a judgment which ends the controversy between
the parties litigant."
The general rule
recognized by the courts of the United States
and by the courts of most, if not all of the
states, is that no judgment or decree will
be regarded as final, within the meaning of
the statutes in reference to appeals, unless
all the issues of law and of fact necessary
to be determined were determined, and the
case completely disposed of, so far as the
court had power to dispose of it: Freem .
.Judgm. P. 34.

-12-
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The policy of the laws of the several states
and of the United States is to prevent unnecessary appeals. It is not the policy of
courts to review cases by piecemeal. The interests of litigants require that cases shall
not be prematurely brought to the highest
court. The errors complained of may be corrected in the court in which they originated;
or the party injured by them might, notwithstanding the injury, have final judgment in
his favor. If a judgment interlocutory in
its nature were the subject of appeal, each of
such judgments rendered in the case could be
brought before the appellate court, and litigants harassed by useless delay and expense,
and the courts burdened with unnecessary
labor. Freem. Judgm. P. 33. The reason of
the rule is obvious. A party against whom
an interlocutory order is made may have all
his wrongs redressed and his rights protected
upon a final hearing and therefore he has
no ground of complaint. If these rights are
not protected on a final hearing in the
trial court, the error can be corrected on
appeal from the final judgment.
The amendments to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have
not altered nor attempted to change this general rule of
law that an appeal lies only from a final order or judgment disposing oE all issues in the action.
As additional support for this position see
Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 P. 580 (1925), wherein the court held that an order authorizing a receiver to
issue and sell receiver's certificates displacing prior
existing liens, not a final and appealable judgment as to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the State of Utah which had an existing mortgage lien on
certain property and went on to state:
Under our constitution and statute, an
appeal lies only from a final judgment.
This court in numerous cases has held
that a judgment to be final for purposes
of an appeal must dispose of the case as
to all of the parties and finally dispose
of the subject matter of the litigation
on the merits, or be a determination of
the particular proceeding or action, or as
sometimes expressed, the case put out of
court.
When a judgment becomes final for all purposes
has been a troublesome question for the courts and the
decisions therefrom are not uniform.

The principle that

for purposes of the effect and duration of Lis Pendens,
judgment becomes final when the subject matter of the
litigation is determined on the merits is consistent

wit~

the finality of judgments in the State of Utah with regar:
to appeal.
One thing is clear, however, from a reading of
the lis pendens statute, supra., and that is its purpose
is to effectuate constructive notice of the pendency of u
action and not actual notice, contrary to the lower court;
finding.

(See: F. 12, R. 227)

In addition, the

-14- by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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doctrine of lis pendens is to be viewed cautiously and its
application strictly construed.

As stated in 54 C.J.S.

Lis Pendens, Section l(c):
The doctrine of lis pendens is not a
favorite of the courts and is not to be
extended without strict necessity. Since
its operation may be harsh in particular
instances and is arbitrary, it will not
be given effect when the reasons which
give rise to it do not require its enforcement, and the limitations to the
rule will be observed with the same
rigidity as exists in the application of
the rule itself. On the other hand, the
rule admits of but few exceptions.
Therefore, if lis pendens were terminated by the
decision of the lower court or if its duration were affected
or terminated by the failure of Hidden Meadows to file and
post a supersedeas bond, then the lower court erred in
holding that Carole Lee Christensen, formerly Carole Lee
Davis and International Environmental Sciences, a limited
partnership, were not bona fide innocent purchasers.

(See

Conclusions of Law 2, 3, R. 230)
The operation and effect of supersedeas or stay
proceedings and its relationship to the duration of lis
pendens on appeal is also a matter over which the courts
are divided.

-15-
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The law is clear that the mere notice and
filing of an appeal does not automatically stay the

ju~~~

of the lower court while on appeal which decision is
sumed valid and accurate.

pre-~

The requirements to effective!·

stay action upon, or execution of the judgment of the
lower court, and to hold that judgment in abeyance while
on appeal, are set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure as follows:
Rule 62(a) Stay Upon Entry of Judgment.
Execution or other proceedings to enforce
a judgment may issue immediately upon the
entry of the judgment, unless the court
in its discretion and on such conditions
for the security of the adverse party as
are proper, otherwise directs.
Rule 62(d) Stay Upon Anneal. ll'hen an
appeal is taken the appellant by giving
a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay,
unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by law or these rules. The bond
may be given at or after the time of filing
the notice of appeal. The stay is effective
when the supersedeas bond is approved by
the court.
Rule 73(d) Supersedeas Bond. Whenever an
appellant ent1tled thereto desires a stay
on appeal, he may present to the court for
its approval a supersedeas bond which shall
have such surety or sureties as the court
requires. The bond shall be conditioned for
the satisfaction of the judgment in full together with costs, interest, and damages for
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delay, if for any reason the appeal is dismissed or if the judgment is affirmed, and to
satisfy in full such modification of the
judgment and such costs, interest, and damages
as the appellate court may adjudge and award.
When the judgment is for the recovery of
money not otherwise secured, the amount of
the bond shall be fixed at such sum as will
cover the whole amount of the judgment remaining unsatisfied, costs on the appeal,
interest, and damages for delay, unless the
court after notice and hearing and for good
cause shown fixes a different amount or orders
security other than the bond. When the judgment determines the disposition of the property in controversy as in real actions,
replevin, and actions to foreclose mortgages
or when such property is in the custody of the
sheriff or when the proceeds of such property
or a bond for its value is in the custody or
control of the court, the amount of the supersedeas bond shall be fixed at such sum only
as will secure the amount recovered for the
use and detention of the property, costs of
the action, costs on appeal, interest, and
damages for delay.
Rule 73(e). Failure to File or Insufficienc
of Bond. If a on on appeal or a superse eas
bond is not filed within the time specified
or if the bond filed is found insufficient,
and if the record on appeal has not been filed
in the Supreme Court, a bond may be filed at
such time before the record is so filed as may
be fixed by the District Court. After the
record is so filed, application for leave to
file a bond may be made only in the Supreme
Court.
The District Court's Order Granting Supersedeas
(R. 44) provided that the plaintiff file and have approved
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by this court a bond in the sum of $50,000 conditioned i: I
accordance with Rule 73(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pn
cedure.

The plaintiff Hidden Meadows failed to abide by

the court's order, and failed to abide by the Utah Rules

I

of Civil Procedure.

The general function of a supersedeas bond and \
its effect upon the enforcement of a judgment is generall.

·

set forth in 4 AmJur Zd Appeal and Error, Section 371

1

where it is stated:
The function of a supersedeas is to stay the
enforcement of a judgment or decree of the
court below brought up for review by appeal
to effect a suspension of the power of the
lower court to issue execution or other process or to execute such process if already
issued. Its effect is to restrain the successful arty and the lower court from taking
a firmat1ve act1on to en orce t e JU gment or
decree. The supersedeas does not operate
aga1nst the judgment 1tself, but aga1nst
its enforcement. As a general rule, the
supersedeas prevents all further proceedings
in a subordinate court in the suit in which
the judgment, order, or decree is rendered
or made, except such as are necessary to
preserve the rights of parties. (Emphasis
added.)
The general effect of a supersedeas bond is
disclosed in 4-A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Section 662 11h::
it is stated:
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The general rule is that the purpose or effect
of a supersedeas or stay is to suspend or stay
proceedings in the trial court, to preserve the
status quo pending the determination of the
appeal or proceeding in error, and to preserve
to appellant the fruits of a meritorious appeal
where they might otherwise be lost to him.
The failure to file a supersedeas bond as required
by the lower court's Order and by the Rules of Civil Procedure validates any action taken by Dee
I.

~1ills

~ills

and Evelyn

in transferring and selling the property which

was the subject of the original option.

Since the decision

in the lower court was in their favor, they were free to
do with this property as they desired unless such action
was stayed by a supersedeas bond.
The case law in the State of Utah is consistent
with the general law irt allowing the prevailing party in a
lower court to enforce that judgment or maintain a status
quo until a supersedeas bond is filed in the Supreme Court
staying all action between or among the parties in the
lower court.

In Skeen v. Pratt, 87 Utah 121, 48 P.Zd 457

(1935), the Utah Supreme Court addressed itself to the
purpose of a supersedeas bond in an action seeking a Writ
of

~1andamus

to command the District Court of Weber County

-19-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to vacate a sheriff's sale of real property.

In holding

that the lower court still had jurisdiction to hear a
motion to vacate the sheriff's sale for impropriety, the
Utah State Supreme Court cited with approval, Bancroft's
Code Practice and Remedies, Vol. 8 page 8684, Section 656;:
wherein it is stated:
In the case of an appeal without supersedeas
or stay, the judgment or order appealed from
is enforceable as though no appeal had been
taken.
The court went on to state:
The citation of additional authorities on this
phase of the case would seem unnecessary, because if an appeal without a supersedeas bond
wholly divests the trial court of power to enforce the judgment or decree appealed from, the
giving of a supersedeas bond would be meaningless. The sole purpose of a supersedeas bond
is to stay the enforcement of the judgment or
decree pending the &ppeal.
Therefore, respondents failure to file and post
the necessary supersedeas returned the true owners of

t~

property to the same status they were in prior to the
commencement of the action.

Only if the lis pendens were

effective through appeal would the lower court be correct
in ruling that International Environmental Sciences, and
ca-col Lee Christensen were not bona fide purchasers because
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of the constructive notice provided by the lis pendens,
which could not continue because Hidden Meadows failed to
file supersedeas.

The record and transcript of testimony

is absolutely void of any evidence of personal or actual
knowledge of the appeal on the part of Carole Lee
Christensen, formerly Carole Lee Davis.
There is substantial authority for the proposition that one who acquires rights in the subject matter of
litigation pending ·appeal takes the property irrespective
of the decision on appeal especially where the appellant
fails to file a supersedeas.
This law is based upon the theory that in order
for the lis pendens to be effective on appeal, a supersedeas must be filed, thereby preserving the status of the
case below and suspending all proceedings with regard to
the judgment and enforcement thereof.
A case directly on point is Chicago

&N.W.

Rail-

way Co. v. Garrett Strickler et. al, v. Chatterton, 339
Ill. 297, 87 N.E. 1009 (1909), where appellants purchased
certain real property from the prevailing party following
a divorce action but prior to its reversal on appeal.

-21-
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In reversing the lower court's ruling setting aside the
conveyance the court stated:
When appellants bought the property in
controversy, the decree was in force.
Had they bought before the writ of
error was sued out, they would have
acquired a title free from any claim of
the ippellee for dower, for the law is
well settled that, when a decree affecting the title to property has been
rendered by a court of equity, the
rights of a purchaser in good faith,
relying upon the decree before any
writ of error is prosecuted or other
action taken to avoid it, will be
protected, nothwithstanding the decree
is afterward reversed. Wadhams v.
Gay, 73 Ill. 415; Barlow v. Standford,
82 Ill. 298; Hannas v. Hannas, 110
Ill. 53; Lambert v. Livingston, 131
Ill. 161, 23 N.E. 352; Hammond v.
People, 178 Ill. 503, 53 N.E. 308.
Assuming, but.not deciding, that appellants had notice of the pendency of
the writ of error, we are brought to
the question whether they took subject
to the final disposition of the case.
The writ of error was not a supersedeas.
The decree was therefore not affected
by it, but, until the judgment of
reversal was rendered, was valid and
effectual, entitled to full faith and
credit in all courts, and enforceable
by all appropriate means. Had it required the payment of alimony, such payment might have been enforced by execution or attachment in spite of the
pendency of the writ of error. If it
had been a decree of foreclosure, it
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might have been executed during the pendency of the writ of error by a sale
·of the premises involved, and the purchaser, if not a party to the suit,
would have acquired a valid title not
subject to be divested by the reversal
of the decree. At common law the writ
of error was itself a supersedeas,
and no bail was required. A defendant,
by suing out a writ of error, could
stop all proceedings in execution of
the judgment without giving any security whatever. 1 Tidd's Pr. 530; 2
Tidd's Pr. 1149; Bacon's Abridgment,
Supersedeas, D, 4; Omaha Hotel Co. v.
Kountze, 107 U.S. 378, 2 Sup. Ct. 911,
27 L. Ed. 609. To avoid this evil
various acts of parliament were passed
requiring security in certain cases in
order that the writ of error should
operate as a supersedeas. Section 106
of the practice act (Hurd's Rev. St:
1908, c. 110) provides that no writ of
error shall operate as a supersedeas
unless the Supreme or Appellate Court
as may be, or some judge thereof in
vacation, after inspecting a copy of
the record, shall so order, and the
plaintiff in error shall file a bond as
in case of appeal. Without such supersedeas, the doctrine of lis pendens
has no application to a writ of error.
"The writ of error without a sup·ersedeas
does not, of itself, stay the proceeding, and to argue otherwise would
be to contend that a party might have
the same relief upon a writ of error
without supersedeas and without bond
as he would be entitled to upon an
appeal." Lancaster v. Snow, 184 Ill.
163, 56 N.E. 416. Everybody was entitled
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to act upon the decree as a valid decree,
and rights acquired in good faith by
strangers to the decree, whether with
or without notice of the writ of error,
cannot be affected by its reversal.
The title of the appellants, Jones and
Strickler, was not, therefore, subject
to appellee's claim of dower.
The order of the superior court will be
reversed and the cause remanded, with
directions to dismiss appellee's crosspetition, and for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Also see Cairo Lumber Co. v. Corwin, 325 Ill. App. 319,
N.E. 2d 110 (1945); Miller v. Dixon, 2 Kan. 445, 42 P.
1014 (1895).
It always has been and ought to remain "the
policy of the law in this country to provide for free
alienation of land"; especially where a self-executing
judgment such as in the instant case confirms ownership
and the right to convey property on the true and rightful
owner.

If it were not for the requirement of supersedeas

in order to effectuate a stay on appeal, the entire risk

would be placed on the prevailing party whose judgment is
presumed valid and accurate.

The failure on the part of

Hidden Meadows to properly prosecute its appeal and obtai
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a stay by filing and posting the appropriate supersedeas
bars by estoppel Hidden Meadows from now seeking specific
performance.

It may properly have a remedy in damages

against Mills under the option but it certainly shouldn't
recover the real property conveyed to a third party, the
return of which would produce inequitable results to all
subsequent purchasers.

POINT II.
IN ALL REMAINING ASPECTS OF THIS
APPEAL, THESE APPELLANTS ADOPT THE
POINTS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANT
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES
WHOSE POSITION IS IDENTICAL WITH THESE
APPELLANTS.

CONCLUSION
Appellants assert that the lis pendens filed by
Hidden Meadows was terminated by the final judgment of the
lower court and in the failure of Hidden Meadows to file
and post a supersedeas staying the effect of the lower
court's judgment, which is presumed valid is evidenced by
the necessity for posting supersedeas to effectuate a stay
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while on appeal.

If in fact, Hidden Meadows has a remedy,

it is against Mills for monetary damages and not against
third persons for specific

performance./~

RESPECTFULLY submitted this ~ay of February,
1978.

HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON

& DU~N

_/ -·~~2~
~~
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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